Presumption of Legitimacy and the  Action en Desaveu by Brouillette, Harold J.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 14 | Number 2
February 1954
Presumption of Legitimacy and the "Action en
Desaveu"
Harold J. Brouillette
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Harold J. Brouillette, Presumption of Legitimacy and the "Action en Desaveu", 14 La. L. Rev. (1954)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol14/iss2/7
Comments
Presumption of Legitimacy and the
"Action en D saveu"
Parts I and II of this Comment appeared in 13 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW at page 587. Part I is an analysis of Civil Code Articles
179, 184-192, and Part II is a discussion of the lacunae and prob-
lems presented by those articles.
III. A SURVEY OF THE LOUISIANA JURISPRUDENCE
The jurisprudence of this state relating to the presumption
of legitimacy and the "action en d6saveu" involves two major
problems and one incidental one. The greater number of deci-
sions concerns the question of who may contest the status of a
person born of a married woman. The second major difficulty is
what must be proved by one who attacks another's status. A
third and incidental problem concerns the application of Article
191 of the Civil Code relating to the time within which the action
en d~saveu must be brought.
Who May Contest Legitimacy-The Exclusiveness of the Action
En Ddsaveu
Article 191 states clearly that only the husband of the mother
or in certain cases his heirs may bring the action of disavowal.
Under the jurisprudence, it is the only way in which the legiti-
macy of a child born or conceived of a married woman may be
contested. It follows that under this interpretation, persons other
than the husband or his heirs may contest legitimacy only by
proving the child was not born or conceived of a married woman.
Thus, the French solution, based on an article similar to Article
197 of the Louisiana Civil Code, to the effect that anyone may
prove another's illegitimacy if that person has not enjoyed the
reputation of being a legitimate child, though he be shown to be
the child of a married woman, is not followed in Louisiana.' In
this section of the Comment the jurisprudence on this question
will be analyzed.
1. See Comment, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 587, 597 (1953).
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In Tate v. Penne,2 the earliest case involving legitimate fili-
ation, the court avoided the question of who may contest the
legitimacy of a child born of a married woman. There the mother
herself sued to recover slaves inherited by her daughter on
grounds that the daughter was an adulterous bastard and as such
was not entitled to inherit. The court did not rule that the mother
was without legal standing to contest the child's status but found
that she failed to prove the physical impossibility of her husband
being the father. Thus, the decision was based on the insuffi-
ciency of evidence. As to her right to bring the action, the court
said, "Even if she had [established physical impossibility of co-
habitation], we have strong doubts whether such a plea could be
received from her, but we do not find it necessary to decide the
question."
The evasion of this most important question in the law of
filiation was, however, short-lived. In 1841, in the case of Eloi v.
Mader,4 the plaintiff asserted rights to a portion of the succession
of Jean Eloi. The admitted facts were that the plaintiff's mother
was married to one Smith at the time of plaintiff's birth and that
Smith died about a year later. The mother then married Eloi and
baptized the plaintiff naming Eloi as the father. The court held
that the plaintiff could not assert himself to be the son of Eloi
because that would be disrupting his own status; further, that
only Smith could have changed the status of a child born to his
wife during their marriage and since he had not chosen to dis-
avow the child, no one else could. The declaration by plaintiff's
mother that he was the child of Eloi was given no weight what-
soever and the court has since been very consistent regarding
that point.5 While it cannot be said that it would have been im-
possible for the husband to have cohabited with the plaintiff's
mother, the holding of Eloi v. Mader was later applied in cases
in which such cohabitation was impossible as a matter of prac-
tical judgment.
2. 7 Mart. N.S. 548 (La. 1829).
3. Id. at 556. Physical impossibility of cohabitation as grounds for dis-
avowal is discussed at p. 408 infra.
4. 1 Rob. 581, 38 Am. Dec. 192 (La. 1841).
5. Dejol v. Johnson, 12 La. Ann. 853 (1857); Beard v. Vincent, 174 La.
869, 141 So. 862 (1932); Evans v. Roberson, 176 La. 280, 145 So. 539 (1933);
Howard v. Ingle, 180 So. 248 (La. App. 1938); Broughton v. T.S.C. Motor
Freight Lines, 200 La. 421, 8 So. 2d 76 (1942); Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113,
62 So. 2d 119 (1952).
[VOL. XIV
COMMENTS
In Vernon v. Vernon's Heirs,6 the plaintiff asserted succession
rights alleging that he was the son of the deceased and proved
that he was born during the marriage of his mother to the de-
ceased. The facts showed that the spouses were living separate
and apart during the period of conception and birth of the plain-
tiff and the defendants sought to prove physical impossibility of
the deceased being the plaintiff's father. The court followed the
interpretation it had given the articles of the Civil Code relating
to the presumption of legitimacy in the Eloi case and held that
the defendants could not be heard to question the plaintiff's
status as that was a right exclusive with the husband of the
mother, or in some cases, his heirs. In Dejol v. Johnson,7 the
court again adhered strictly to this interpretation and held that
the legitimacy of the plaintiffs could not be questioned by the
administrator of the estate of their mother's husband. The court
said that since the plaintiffs were born during the marriage of
their mother to the deceased, only he was entitled to contest their
legitimacy. It said further that such an action must be by special
suit, brought for that purpose, in which the child is made a party.
The actual improbability of the deceased in the Dejol case
being the father was not brought out by the decision, and it was
not until 1892 in the case of Succession of Saloy8 that grave
doubts were cast upon the reasonableness of the rule of Eloi v.
Mader. The widow Saloy was one of three children born to her
mother while living in New Orleans. It was undisputed that her
mother had been married in Cuba to Juan Gestal who remained
there when the widow Saloy's mother eloped with another to
live in New Orleans. In her succession, the widow having no
issue, the state claimed it was entitled to the assets of the succes-
sion because the deceased was an adulterous illegitimate and as
such had no relatives. But following the decision in the Eloi case,
the court held that the widow Saloy was the legitimate daughter
of Juan Gestal. While the decision gave the widow Saloy a filial
status obviously contrary to biological fact, the court neverthe-
less was able to expound a pattern for interpreting the legisla-
tion which seemed logically consistent. In pointing out that the
French "contestation d'tat" includes contestation of legitimacy
for any grounds, it explained that any interested party has a
right to contest the identity of an alleged heir or of its mother,
6. 6 La. Ann. 242 (1851).
7. 12 La. Ann. 853 (1857).
8. 44 La. Ann. 433, 10 So. 872 (1892).
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or to allege and prove that the child was not born during mar-
riage. But the court emphasized that when it is once established
that the child was born of a married woman, the only remaining
"contestation d'6tat" is the action en d6saveu and that this action
may be instituted only by the husband of the mother or his heirs
and within certain limited delays. The court stated its conception
of the rationale behind the rules of the Civil Code on this point
and these words have been used as the basis of all the jurispru-
dence on this subject since that time:
"The law has made [the husband of the mother] the sole
judge of the propriety of engaging in such a course, with a
reserve of the right to his heirs of doing so, in the event of
his death within the delay. He is the only one who perhaps
can know that he is not the father.
"When, aware of the circumstances under which he
might have exercised the right of repudiation, the husband,
who is the sovereign arbiter of his honor, fails to do so, the
door is forever closed and no one can afterward assert a right
strictly personal to him.
"Permitting such a thing would be to strike a heavy
blow at the sacredness of family ties, keep the honor of the
wife and of the children in a condition of constant trepida-
tion and allow the foundation of society to be, at all times,
exposed to tottering and upturning. 'Status hominum in
perpetua incertitudine fluctuaret.'-9
In later cases, the court did not deviate from the strict rule
of Eloi v. Mader. Although discussing the grounds alleged by the
party contesting the child's status, the'court based its decisions
on the rule that only the husband of the mother can contest the
legitimacy of a child born during marriage. 10
In Beard v. Vincent," the plaintiffs alleged they were chil-
dren of the deceased and, as such, his legitimate heirs; they
proved that he was married to their mother when they were
born. The court held that they were not estopped to claim rights
9. 44 La. Ann. 433, 443, 10 So. 872, 876.
10. McNeely v. McNeely, 47 La. Ann. 1321, 17 So. 928 (1895); Ezidore v.
Cureau's Heirs, 113 La. 839, 37 So. 773 (1904); Succession of Flynn, 161 La. 707,
109 So. 395 (1926); Favre v. Celotex Co., 139 So. 904 (La. App. 1932); Evans v.
Roberson, 176 La. 280, 145 So. 539 (1933); Jenkins v. Aetna Casualty Co., 158 So.
217 (La. App. 1935); Vallery v. Teche Lines, Inc., 166 So. 646 (La. App. 1936);
Smith v. Smith, 214 La. 881, 39 So. 2d 162 (1949).
11. 174 La. 869, 141 So. 862 (1932).
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in the succession although it was shown that they were born
while their mother was living in adultery with Armogene Vin-
cent and that earlier they had been admitted erroneously to
Vincent's succession as his legitimate heirs.
A court of appeal case involving workmen's compensation
perhaps best illustrates the extremes to which the rule of Eloi
v. Mader may lead. In Favre v. Celotex Co.,1 2 an action was
brought by the mother of an employee who was killed while in
the employ of defendant. She alleged that her son was born in
1911 while she was legally married to one Billard, that he was
therefore her legitimate son and that she was partially dependent
on him for support. Defendant sought to introduce a sworn state-
ment which the plaintiff had submitted to the court in another
cause in 192713 that she had not seen nor heard from her hus-
band, Billard, since 1908. But the court did -not admit this state-
ment into the record. The reason given was that only the husband
of the mother may question the legitimacy of her child. One dis-
senting justice felt constrained to remark that the decision
amounted to a fraud on the defendant.
Causes For Disavowal
A search of the jurisprudence of Louisiana fails to reveal a
successful attack on the status of a person born of a married
woman. There are only four cases involving an actual action en
d6saveu as contemplated by the Civil Code-that is, only four
cases in which the action was brought by the husband of the
mother and within the prescribed delays and in none of these
was the action successful.1 4 Most of the jurisprudence in which
the grounds for disavowal are discussed is made up of cases in
which the status of a person was contested by someone other
than the husband of the mother or his heirs. As has been said,
the court in all instances except one" disposed of these allega-
tions of illegitimacy by stating that only the husband of the
mother, or in certain cases his heirs, may contest legitimacy. The
result is that there are many pages of dicta, and these dicta have
12. 139 So. 904 (La. App. 1932).
13. This suit was an attempt by the plaintiff to secure the court's per-
mission to remarry in accordance with Article 80 of the Civil Code, now
repealed.
14. Kuhlman v. Kuhlman, 137 La. 263, 68 So. 604 (1915); Switzer v. Swit-
zer, 170 La. 550, 128 So. 477 (1930); Lejeune v. Lejeune, 184 La. 837, 167 So.
747 (1936); Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So. 2d 119 (1952).
15. In Tate v. Penne, 7 Mart. (N.S.) 548 (La. 1829), the decision was based
on other grounds as related at p. 402 supra.
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been looked to by the court in deciding the four cases in which
the action was properly instituted. This jurisprudence will be
examined under the headings corresponding to the causes for
disavowal listed in the Civil Code.
In Part I of this Comment it was shown that there are five
instances in which the husband of the mother may disavow her
child: (1) When the child is born less than 180 days after mar-
riage, (2) when the child is born 300 or more days after dissolu-
tion of the marriage, 0 (3) when the child is born 300 or more
days after separation from bed and board, (4) when the wife has
committed adultery and has concealed the birth of the child from
her husband, and (5) when it was physically impossible for the
husband to be the father because of his remoteness from the
mother.
There is no jurisprudence in which grounds (1) or (2), above,
have been alleged.
(3) Child born 300 or more days after separation from bed
and board. Article 187, by referring to Article 186, says that the
non-presumption of paternity in the husband of the mother
"applies with respect to the child born three hundred days . . .
after the sentence of separation from bed and board." In McNeely
v. McNeely, T the plaintiff attacked the validity of a will naming
the defendant as universal legatee; further, plaintiff alleged that
even if the will was valid, the legacy was subject to reduction be-
cause he was the legitimate child of the deceased and thus en-
titled to the forced portion of his father's succession. By way of
defense, the universal legatee attacked the status of the plaintiff
showing that he was born more than three hundred days after a
declaration of separation from bed and board between his par-
ents. However, it was shown by the plaintiff that the decedent
had never contested his legitimacy. The court held the will to be
valid, but reduced the legacy to the two-thirds disposable por-
tion, declaring that the universal legatee was without legal right
to contest the status of the plaintiff as that right belongs exclu-
sively to the husband of his mother. Under the facts proved, it
seems clear that had the action been brought by the decedent
and within the delay period prescribed by the Civil Code it
would have been successful. However, it should be remembered
16. The peculiarities of this situation are discussed in Part I of this
Comment, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 587, 591-592 (1953).
17. 47 La. Ann. 1321, 17 So. 928 (1895).
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that under such facts, the wife may attempt to prove that there
was cohabitation after the decree of separation and if successful
in such attempt, the action en d6saveu fails.'8  Birth of the
child three hundred or more days after separation from bed and
board was not grounds in any of the four actions en d6saveu.
(4) Adultery of the wife and concealment of the birth.
Article 185 provides that adultery of the wife is not grounds for
disavowal unless the birth of the child is concealed from the
husband. Lejeune v. Lejeune,19 was an action en d6saveu in
which the husband pleaded adultery and concealment. In an
earlier suit, he was successful in obtaining a divorce by proving
adultery by his wife. In the wife's answer to the divorce suit,
she alleged that she was pregnant and that allegation proved to
be deciding factor in the subsequent action en d6saveu. The court
looked to French doctrine 20 in deciding that concealment under
Article 185 means concealment of pregnancy as well as birth,
and hence, the husband had not met the requirements of that
article.2 1 It is noteworthy that Justice Foumet did not subscribe
to the majority's interpretation of Article 185.
In Feazel v. Feazel,22 the most recent action en d6saveu, the
plaintiff husband did not meet the first requirement of proving
adultery, but the court proceeded to discuss the matter of con-
cealment and concluded that he had also failed in that attempt.
The facts were that the wife left the state and gave birth to the
child while living in Kansas. There was evidence that the hus-
band did not know of his wife's pregnancy nor of the subsequent
birth until several days after the child was born. The important
factor in the court's determination that the requirements of
Article 185 had not been met was that, when the child's birth
was registered, the plaintiff, the husband of the mother, was
named as the father of the child. Again looking to the French
18. Art. 188, La. Civil Code of 1870.
19. 184 La. 837, 167 So. 747 (1936).
20. 3 Baudry-Lacantinerie, Trait6 Th6orique et Pratique de Droit Civil
§ 488 (3d ed. 1902).
21. "It is difficult for us to imagine in what better way she could have
placed her husband on notice that she was going to give birth to a child
other than by apprising him of her pregnant condition. In the natural course
of events, it was inevitable that a child would be born. He could not, by his
own indifference to the result which was to naturally and normally follow,
say that the birth of the child had been concealed from him. The slightest
inquiry on his part would have revealed that the child had been born. There
was nothing hidden from him. The law does not require her to formally
notify him of the child's arrival." 184 La. 837, 846, 167 So. 747, 749 (1936).
22. 222 La. 113, 62 So. 2d 119 (1952).
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commentators, 2 the court reasoned that if a wife registers a
child as that of her husband, by that action alone she has made
the birth public, thus negativing any idea of concealment.
Summarizing the two cases, it would seem that the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the requirements of proving adultery
and concealment as contemplated by Article 185 are (1) clear
proof of adultery, (2) concealment of the pregnancy by the wife,
(3) concealment of the birth by the wife, and (4) an attempt by
the wife after the birth of the child to keep its identity concealed.
(5) Physical impossibility of the husband being the father.
Article 189 provides thAt the presumption of paternity in the
husband ceases "when the remoteness of the husband from the
wife has been such that cohabitation has been physically impos-
sible." In Tate v. Penne,24 a mother sought to have her daughter
declared an adulterous illegitimate, alleging that her husband
could not have been the father of the child because of his remote-
ness from her at the time of its conception and birth. The evi-
dence showed that the spouses had voluntarily separated and
were living apart when the child was conceived, but the decision
does not indicate how far apart they resided. The testimony
dealt only with the whereabouts of the husband during the
conception period, and the court said that this "negative" testi-
mony was not sufficient to prove physical impossibility.25 Al-
though the case was not an action en d~saveu, the decision was
based on the plaintiff's failure to prove impossibility of co-
habitation. 26
In Vernon v. Vernon's Heirs,27 although the decision was
based on the incapacity of the party to contest legitimacy,28
the court expressed the opinion that the requirements of physical
impossibility'of cohabitation were not met. The spouses had
married in South Carolina, and the evidence showed that the
wife had left her husband to live in Kentucky: Only one witness
was used in attempting to prove the remoteness, and he said that
the husband remained in South Carolina and that he saw him
about two or three times a month. He could not testify as to the
23. 3 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 20, at §§ 489, 490.
24. 7 Mart. N.S. 548 (La. 1829).
25. "The evidence of the husband's residence is only negative. He was
not on the east side of the lake. Where the wife was, the proof is silent. How
can we tell from the evidence that they did not meet and cohabit?" Id. at 555.
26. See p. 402 supra.
27. 6 La. Ann. 242 (1851).
28. See p. 403 supra.
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whereabouts of the wife during the separation; he had merely
been told that she lived in Kentucky. Under these facts, the
requirements of Article 189 were not considered met. The court
said further that even if it had been shown that the wife remained
in Kentucky during the period of conception, remoteness as con-
templated by Article 189 would not necessarily have been proved,
for the husband lived close enough to Kentucky to have visited
her there without the above-mentioned witness knowing of such
visit. In Harris v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corporation,29 there
was a very feeble attempt to prove physical impossibility of
cohabitation. The evidence was clear that the spouses were living
only a few miles apart when the child was conceived, and the
court concluded that the requirements of Article 189 had not been
met. This article was pleaded as grounds for disavowal in only
three other cases.8 0 In each of them it was shown that the
spouses lived in the same city when the child was conceived,
and in each the court ruled that cohabitation was not physically
impossible.
Summarizing the jurisprudence, it appears that it is very
difficult for a husband to meet the requirements of Article 189
as applied by the Supreme Court. Excluding special circum-
stances, such as one of the spouses being confined in prison, it
would appear that in order to prove physical impossibility of
cohabitation, the husband would have to show that the spouses
were a great distance apart during the time of conception and
also show the whereabouts of both spouses at all times during
that period. In view of modern transportation facilities, the
possibility of meeting these requirements becomes increasingly
remote.
Delay Period for Bringing Action en Ddsaveu
The case of Kuhlman v. Kuhlman8 ' illustrates the narrow-
ness with which the court interprets the provisions of Article 191
prescribing the delay periods within which the husband must
institute the action en d6saveu. In the case where the husband is
absent when the child is born, it provides that he must institute
the action within two months after his return. This was the
factual situation in the Kuhlman case, and the plaintiff husband
29. 13 La. App. 416, 127 So. 40 (1930).
30. Switzer v. Switzer, 170 La. 550, 128 So. 477 (1930); Lejeune v. Lejeune,
184 La. 837, 167 So. 747 (1936); Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So. 2d 119
(1952).
31. 137 La. 263, 68 So. 604 (1915).
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filed the action within the delay period, but the suit was dismissed
on an exception of jurisdiction.8 2 Six months later he filed a
second action, this one in the proper court, and the wife success-
fully pleaded two months prescription under Article 191. On
appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff contended that the
institution of the action stopped the running of prescription
regardless of the fact that it was filed in the wrong court. But
the court affirmed the decision of the district court sustaining
the plea of prescription. It may be, then, that the only case in
which the husband may have met the very stringent requirements
for disavowal was lost because of a procedural error on the part
of counsel.
IV. COMPARISON AND APPRAISAL
The concluding part of this comment includes a brief com-
parison of the French Civil Code articles and jurisprudence to
the Louisiana law previously discussed. This is followed by an
appraisal of the Louisiana situation and suggestions for the
changes which appear to be needed.
Exclusiveness of the Right to Contest Legitimate
Paternity Under the French Civil Code
Articles 312-317 of the French Civil Code prescribe basically
the same rules as Articles 184-192 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
These articles permit the husband of the mother, or in certain
cases his heirs, to disavow her child for certain named causes.
They specifically preclude all other persons from instituting an
action to disavow. It should be remembered, however, that these
articles in both the French and Louisiana Codes deal only with
children born of a married woman.83 Hence, they do not prevent
other interested persons from disproving the identity of the
alleged mother, or from proving that the child was not born of
a married woman, or that the mother was not married to the
alleged father.
The French courts' interpretation of Article 325 of the French
Civil Code has greatly minimized the effect of the very stringent
requirements of Articles 312-317. That article is in the chapter
32. The Supreme Court agreed with the ruling of the district court that
the domicile of the plaintiff husband is the proper jurisdiction for the in-
stitution of the action en d~saveu "for the conclusive reason that the domi-
cile of the father is the domicile of the child of the marriage." A discussion
of the correctness of this ruling is beyond the scope of this comment.
33. See Part I of this Comment, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REvisw 587, 589 (1953).
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of the French Code entitled "Of Proofs of Filiation of Legitimate
Children." The earlier articles of that chapter enumerate the
ways in which a person may assert and prove legitimate filiation.
Article 325 provides:
"Proof to the contrary may be made by all means of a nature
to establish that the claimant is not the child of the person
who he pretends to be his mother, or even, if the maternity
is proved, that he is not the child of the mother's husband."8 4
(Italics supplied.)
The French courts have held that this article is applicable to
the situation in which the person who asserts legitimate filiation
lacks the apparent status or reputation of legitimacy.85 The result
of this interpretation is that in cases in which there is no such
status, any interested person may prove that the person who
asserts legitimate filiation "is not the child of the mother's hus-
band." The French do not consider this an action en d~saveu, as
that name is reserved to an action by the husband of the mother
or his heirs, under the rules and requirements of Articles 312-
317.88 Even if the status is questioned by the husband of the
mother, it is not an action en d6saveu if the basis of his action is
Article 325.37 The effect of this interpretation of Article 325 on
the entire subject of the presumption of legitimacy is tremen-
dous. The many cases in which children are born to a mother
who is living openly in adultery are easily resolved under
this rule. Article 197 of the Louisiana Code is in substance the
same as Article 325 of the French Code, but quite obviously the
Louisiana courts have not followed the French reasoning. If
they had, decisions such as Succession of Saloy,8  Eloi v. Mader,89
Dejol v. Johnson,40 Beard v. Vincent,4' and Favre v. Celotex Co.42
could not possibly have been rendered. At least one writer has
suggested that the French application of the article is the proper
34. Art. 325, French Civil Code (Cachard's transl. 1930) (punctuation by
writer).
35. 2 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais § 733
(2d ed. 1952); 1 Colin et Capitant, Trait6 de Droit Civil § 913 (Julliot de la
Morandi~re's ed. 1953).
36. 2 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 814; 1 Colin et Capi-
tant, op. cit. supra 35, at § 907.
37. 1 Ripert, Trait6 P2lmentaire de Droit Civil de Marcel Planiol, no 1309
(1948).
38. 44 La. Ann. 433, 10 So. 872 (1892).
39. 1 Rob. 581, 38 Am. Dec. 192 (La. 1841).
40. 12 La. Ann. 853 (1857).
41. 174 La. 869, 141 So. 862 (1932).
42. 139 So. 904 (La. App. 1932).
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one and that the Louisiana courts should follow it. 4 3 It is note-
worthy that the result of the French courts' application of Article
325-permitting persons other than the husband of the mother
to contest the status of her children-is not without criticism.44
Other Consequences of French Civil Code Article 325
The problem of who may contest legitimacy is not the only
area which is affected by the French courts' interpretation of
Article 325. As stated earlier, the article is not one of the group
relating to the action en d6saveu. Hence, the rules prescribed in
that group of articles have no application when Article 325 is
the basis of an attack on a person's legitimate filiation. It is not
necessary to establish any certain set of facts as Articles 312-317
require. All evidence is admissible which may tend to disprove
the paternity of the mother's husband, and, if there is a pre-
ponderance of evidence to that effect, the contesting party is
successful. It follows that the articles prescribing the delay
periods within which the action en d6saveu must be brought 45
likewise have no application. 48
Causes for Disavowal Under French
Civil Code Articles 312-317
Presumptions and non-presumptions of paternity in the
French Civil Code are very similar to those prescribed in the
Louisiana Code. However, there are differences which will be
shown in the discussion following:
(1) Child born less than 180 days after marriage. Article 314
of the French Code provides that the husband may cotest the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife less than 180 days after
his marriage unless (1) he had knowledge of his wife's preg-
nancy before the marriage, or (2) he was present at the recorda-
43. See Work of the Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term, 14 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEw 62, 125 (1953).
44. Rouast does not disagree with the application of Article 325 of the
French Code to situations in which there is no reputation of legitimacy, but
he feels that permitting anyone but the husband of the mother to contest
status violates the whole scheme of Articles 312-317 and is a misinterpreta-
tion of Article 325. 2 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 733. See
also 1 Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 913.
45. Arts. 316, 317, French Civil Code.
46. 1 Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 913. As a matter of
statutory interpretation, the writer does not agree with the French court's
analysis of Article 325. It would appear, however, that the rules developed
under this analysis suggest a more workable scheme which deserves consid-
eration in planning legislative change.
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tion of the birth and signed or placed his mark on such record, or
(3) it has been declared that the child cannot live. Except for
the provision precluding the action when "it has been declared
that the child cannot live," this article is the same as Article 186
of the Louisiana Code.
The application of this article has not raised any serious diffi-
culties because proof of the dates of marriage and the birth is
all that is required of the husband in this situation.47
(2) Child born 300 or more days after dissolution of marriage.
Article 187 of the Louisiana Civil Code is very similar to Article
315 of the French Code, but there is a difference in their language
which could lead to difficulty. The latter provides:
"The legitimacy of the child born 300 days after the dissolu-
tion of the marriage may be contested."
Article 187 of the Louisiana Civil Code, by referring to Article
186, which provides that a husband may contest the legitimacy
of a child born less than 180 days after marriage, provides:
"The same rule applies with respect to the child born 300
days after the dissolution of the marriage, or after sentence
of separation from bed and board."
The French courts have held that "may be contested" under
Article 315 means may be contested by any interested person and
at any time; 4 an actual action en d~saveu is not required. 49 The
necessity of making even this simple protest has been criticized
by French commentators who feel that a child born 300 or more
days after dissolution of marriage should be considered illegiti-
mate from the fact of birth at that date.50
47. 2 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 806; 1 Colin et Capi-
tant, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 906.
48. 1 Ripert, op. cit. supra note 37, at no 1309 (1948); 2 Planiol et Ripert,
op. cit. supra note 35, at § 733; 1 Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra note 35, at
§ 896. The writer feels compelled to disagree with these conclusions as a
matter of statutory interpretation. The fact that Article 315 is one of the
group of articles dealing with the action en d~saveu would seem to indicate
that the words "may be contested" mean may be contested by the husband
in an action en d~saveu.
The new Italian Civil Code of 1939 has remedied the problem. Article
248 provides that in the case of a child born 300 or more days after dissolu-
tion of the marriage, legitimacy may be contested by any interested party
at any time such interest is threatened.
49. The statement is in conflict with the statement in Part I of this
Comment, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 587, 592 (statement preceding note 2)
(1953). The latter is faulty and was the result of a mistranslation.
50. 2 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 733. See also Bailly,
L'article 315 du code civil et la condition des enfants n~s plus de 300 jours
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While there is no Louisiana jurisprudence interpreting Article
187 of the Louisiana Civil Code, a comparison of the wording of
this article with that of Article 315 of the French Code indicates
that an interpretation different from that of the French might
result. In order to understand the problem it is necessary to
consider Article 186. Under that article, it is required that the
husband institute an action en d~saveu to disavow a child born
less than 180 days after marriage. Article 187 says "The same
rule applies," which could reasonably be taken to mean that an
action en d6saveu is required. This argument is further strength-
ened by reason of the fact that the provision, which permits dis-
avowal in case of birth 300 or more days after separation from
bed and board, is part of Article 187, and an action en d6saveu is
necessary to contest legitimate paternity under those circum-
stances.51 However, requiring an action en d6saveu to contest
the legitimacy of a child born 300 or more days after dissolution
of marriage could lead to absurdities. It would be highly illogical
to require the action by a husband when his former wife bears
a child years after divorce, or to require his heirs to institute the
action when a child is born years after the death of the husband.
(3) Birth 300 or more days after separation from bed and
board. In France, from the time of the promulgation of the Code
Napoleon in 1804 until the year 1850, a child born to a mother
who was legally separated from her husband was considered a
child born during marriage, and there was no cessation of the
presumption of paternity.52 Since 1850, however,5  a child born
300 or more days after separation from bed and board may be
disavowed by a simple declaration by the husband of the mother
that he is not the father of the child.54 This is the same simple
declaration which is required in the case of a child born 300 or
more days after dissolution of the marriage. However, only the
husband may make the declaration when there has been a judicial
separation, whereas, as shown earlier, any interested person may
do so when there has been a dissolution of the marriage.
apr~s la dissolution du mariage, 47 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil 372
(1949).
51. See discussion of child born 300 or more days after separation from
bed and board below.
52. 2 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 808; 1 Colin et Capi-
tant, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 905.
53. Law of Dec. 6, 1850, Dalloz, Jurisprudence G~n~rale, IV, 207 (1850).
54. 2 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 809; 1 Colin et Capi-
tant,, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 905. The writer disagrees with the interpre-
tation of this amendment for the same reasons set forth in note 48 supra,
relating to the child born 300 or more days after dissolution of the marriage.
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In all three of the civil codes of Louisiana, there have been
provisions permitting the husband to disavow a child born 300
or more days after separation from bed and board.5 5 However, it
appears from the language of the court in the case of McNeely v.
McNeely,56 which is the only case involving the status of a person
born 300 or more days after separation from bed and board, that
a simple declaration by the husband is not sufficient to disavow
such a child, and that an action en d6saveu is necessary. But the
language of the court regarding this question is dictum; the basis
of the decision was that only the husband of the mother may
contest legitimacy, and hence the defendant, universal legatee
of the estate in question, was without standing to make such con-
test. However, the dictum in the McNeely case is very clear:
"It is, in our view, clear, under our Code, that the legitimacy
of the child of the wife not divorced, born after the judgment
of separation of bed and board, cannot be disputed, unless the
suit is brought by the husband to disavow that legitimacy.'' 57
(Italics supplied.)
Another interesting problem which arises in the case of a
child born 300 or more days after separation from bed and board
is the question of whether such a child may be legitimated by
the wife's second husband when the child has not been disavowed
by her first husband. On this point, a French legislative enact-
ment of December 30, 1915, adds something to the French Civil
Code which is unknown to the law of Louisiana. Article 313 of
the French Code, by virtue of this 1915 amendment, provides that
where a child born 300 or more days after separation (and hence
subject to disavowal by the husband) is legitimated by the second
marriage of the mother in conformity with Article 331, the child
is no longer presumed to be the child of the former husband, even
though he has not acted to disavow it.
(4) Concealment of birth. The first paragraph of Article 313
of the French Civil Code provides that a husband cannot disavow
his wife's child on grounds of adultery "unless the birth has been
concealed from him, in which case he is allowed to prove all
facts tending to show that he is not the father." Article 185 of the
Louisiana Code is substantially the same as this article, but the
articles have received different interpretations by the courts. 8
55. Art. 9, La. Civil Code of 1808; Art. 206, La. Civil Code of 1825; Art.
187, La. Civil Code of 1870.
56. 47 La. Ann. 1321, 17 So. 928 (1895).
57. 47 La. Ann. 1321, 1324, 17 So. 928, 929.
58. The Louisiana jurisprudence interpreting Article 185 has been dis-
cussed at p. 407 supra.
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The French courts have held that concealment of pregnancy,
or even an attempt at concealing pregnancy, is sufficient to con-
stitute concealment under Article 313.51 However, proof of
concealment alone is not sufficient to complete the disavowal.
The husband must also convince the court that he is not the
father of the child; he may do this by any evidence at his dis-
posal.6 0 Proof that the wife committed adultery is not an indis-
pensable part of this evidence, although some writers have
suggested that it should be."'
(5) Physical impossibility of cohabitation. Paragraph 2 of
Article 312 of the French Civil Code provides that a husband may
disavow his wife's child if it was physically impossible for him to
cohabit with the wife during the period of conception. Then it
names the two situations in which there is physical impossibility
of cohabitation: (1) "on account of absence" or (2) "owing to
some accident." Article 189 of the Louisiana Civil Code is very
similar, but there is only one "physical impossibility" situation
named, and that is remoteness of the husband from his wife.
Hence, the Louisiana Code provides one less cause for disavowal
than the French Code.
The physical impossibility of cohabitation "owing to some
accident" is usually referred to as "accidental impotence" as con-
trasted with natural impotence, which is not a cause for dis-
avowal.6 2 Thus, the determination of whether impotence is acci-
dental or natural becomes very important in France. Generally,
the distinction drawn is that accidental impotence must be the
result of some external wound or surgical operation,6 3 while
natural impotence is usually congenital or the result of natural
causes. There is conflict as to whether impotence resulting from
sickness is accidental or natural.6 4 The Louisiana Civil Code pro-
59. 2 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 803; 1 Colin et Capi-
tant, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 904. See also the recent case of the Cour
d'appel of Paris, Feb. 26, 1953, D. 1953, 445, 52 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit
Civil 517 (1953).
60. 2 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 804; 1 Colin et Capi-
tant, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 904.
61. 2 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 805; 1 Colin et Capi-
tant, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 904. Note that proof of both adultery and
concealment is required under the Louisiana Supreme Court's interpretation
of Article 185. See p. 407 supra.
Article 235(4) of the Italian Civil Code requires proof of adultery as
well as proof of concealment of both pregnancy and birth.
62. Art. 313, French Civil Code.
63. 2 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 801; 1 Colin et Capitant,
op. cit. supra note 35, at § 903.
64. Ibid.
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vides simply that impotence is not sufficient grounds for dis-
avowal, 5 and has no provision corresponding to the "accidental
impotence" provision in the French Code.
Proof of physical impossibility of cohabitation because of
absence or remoteness of the husband is very difficult under both
the Louisiana and French courts' interpretations of their respec-
tive codal provisions, except in situations where one of the spouses
is confined in prison or in a hospital or mental institution.
There is no substantial difference in the interpretations given the
respective provisions in the Louisiana and French Civil Codes.66
Delay Periods for Bringing the Action en Dgsaveu
Article 316 of the French Civil Code prescribes the same delay
periods as Article 191 of the Louisiana Code.67 Both of these
articles provide that in the case of a husband who is absent at
the time of the birth, the action must be instituted within two
months after his return. The French courts, however, have held
that the important factor in determining the beginning of the run-
ning of the delay is not the actual date of the husband's return,
but the time of his being informed of the birth.6
Appraisal and Suggestions for Change
Looking back, we find that Articles 184-191 of the Louisiana
Civil Code and the interpretations placed on them have extended
the presumption of legitimacy to unreasonable ends. Concededly,
the presumption of legitimacy should be rebuttable only by very
strong evidence; but legal presumptions should not lead to such
absurdities as are found in Succession of Saloy' 9 and Favre v.
Celotex Co.7 0 The jurisconsults who prepared the Code Napoleon
of 1804 had a most beautiful plan in mind when they drafted the
articles relating to the presumption of legitimacy.7'1 In theory,
the articles seem to say: Where there is doubt as to the paternity
of a child born to a married woman, that doubt should be resolved
65. Art. 185. La. Civil Code of 1870.
66. See discussion of the Louisiana jurisprudence on this point at p.
408 supra. The French jurisprudence on this subject is discussed in'some
detail in 2 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 800. See also 1 Colin
et Capitant, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 892.
67. See discussion of the delay periods under the Louisiana Code in Part
I of this Comment, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 587, 593 (1953).
68. 2 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 35, at §§ 793, 794.
69. 44 La. Ann. 433, 10 So. 872 (1892).
70. 139 So. 904 (La. App. 1932).
71. Discussion Du Conseil D'Etat, 10 Fenet, Recueil Complet des Travaux
Pr4paratoires du Code Civil 3 et seq. (1836).
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by declaring the husband to be the father. In situations where
there can be no doubt that the husband is not the father, he may
disavow his wife's child. But a husband in such a situation may
nevertheless wish to be considered the father; he has displayed
this desire when he fails to contest the child's status immediately
after birth. Since the husband did in fact wish that the child
be considered his and did not want his wife to be shamed for her
misdeed, no one else should be permitted to contest the child's
status or to brand his wife as an adulteress.
Nobody will question the desirability of such a plan. No law
could be more consistent with Christian principles. But a century
and a half of jurisprudence has shown that this plan, as set out
in the articles of the civil codes of many countries, simply has
not worked. Courts have had to add new meanings to the words
of the articles in attempts to avoid unfairness and absurdity.72
Many decisions have been very unfair where the language of the
articles was unequivocal and could not be dodged. Several French
commentators have criticized many of the provisions of these
articles. 78 It seems clear that the redactors of the Code Napoleon
did not anticipate the unfair and even absurd results reached by
an application of these rules. Suffice it to say that there is a need
for change in the law of this state relating to the presumption of
legitimacy. The writer offers the following suggestions in the
hope that they will be of some benefit in revising the legislation
on the subject.
It seems clear that different rules should govern situations
in which the child whose legitimacy is contested is from all
appearances considered to be the child of the mother's husband
and those in which a common sense appreciation of the facts
would indicate that the child is the product of his mother's
adulterous conduct. It is submitted that the problems involving
status of persons can be most realistically resolved by dividing
circumstances of birth into four categories and applying different
rules to each category:
(1) A child born to a woman who is living with her husband
or who has not been voluntarily separated, judicially separated,
or divorced from him for 300 or more days, should be presumed
72. See supra notes 46, 48, 54.
73. See, for example, 2 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 35, at §§ 733,
816; 1 Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 913.
[VOL. XiV
1954] COMMENTS
to be the child of the mother's husband;74 for disavowal of a child
born under these circumstances, the following rules are sub-
mitted:
1. There should be disavowal only by the husband of the
mother, or, in the event of his death during the delay
period, by his heirs.
2. The husband should be successful in this action only if he
can convince the court to a reasonable degree of certainty
that he is not the father of the child.7 5 On the matter of
evidence:
(a) Certain and permanent impotence or sterility should
of themselves be sufficient for disavowal.
7 6
(b) Circumstances which strongly indicate non-paternity
such as the concealment of birth, temporary impo-
tence, uncertain sterility, and the distance separating
the spouses at the time of conception, or the fact
that the child probably was conceived before mar-
riage, should be evidentiary factors, but not suffi-
cient in and of themselves for disproof of paternity.
3. The husband or his heirs should have a reasonable period
of time after knowledge of the birth in which to institute
74. It should be noted that this classification includes a child born at
any time during the marriage, even if conception before marriage is indi-
cated. This would not involve a change in the existing substantive rule, for
under Article 186, the child is considered that of the husband unless he dis-
avows it. There might be, however, a shift in the burden of proof in such
instances of disavowal. Whereas the proposed rule would require the husband
in all cases to prove he is not the father, under Article 190 "the husband can-
not contest legitimacy ... if he was acquainted with the circumstances of his
wife being pregnant previously to the marriage," a provision which may
mean that the wife has the burden of proving his knowledge.
75. A survey of the jurisprudence and statutes of the common law states
on the subject of proof of non-paternity reveals a great variety of evidence
rules. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that nothing short
of actual impossibility of the husband being the father shall suffice to prove
non-paternity. Patterson v. Gaines, 6 How. 550 (U.S. 1848). Some courts have
said that the evidence must prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the
husband is not the father. Egbert v. Greenwalt, 44 Mich. 245, 6 N.W. 654, 38
Am. Rep. 260 (1880). Others require evidence that is "clear and conclusive."
State v. Romaine, 58 Iowa 46, 11 N.W. 721 (1882). The courts of some states
have held that "competent testimony sufficient to satisfy the mind of the
tribunal" is sufficient. Wilson v. Babb, 18 S.C. 59 (1882). See Note, 36 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 255 (1912).
76. The writer fails to see why certain and permanent impotence or
sterility should not be sufficient grounds for disavowal. Perhaps in 1804,
permanence of impotence was always uncertain, but that is no longer true.
As far as could be determined, Louisiana Is the only state in which perma-
nent impotence is not sufficient grounds. It is noteworthy that the new
Italian Civil Code provides that impotence, "even if only impotence to pro-
create" Is sufficient cause for disavowal. Art. 235 (2), Italian Civil Code.
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the disavowal action. This period should be substantially
longer than the one and two month delays presently pre-
scribed by Article 191.77
(2) A child born to a wife who has been voluntarily sep-
arated from her husband for 300 or more days should be pre-
sumed to be the child of the mother's husband; however:
1. Legitimacy should be susceptible of contest by any person
who has a real interest in the question. This interest
should be a substantial one so as to prevent attacks for
personal or malicious reasons.
2. The attack should be successful only if the evidence is
such as completely to satisfy the court that the husband
is not the father.
3. There should be no limit on the time within which the
contest may be made.
(3) A child born 300 or more days after judicial separation
should be presumed to be illegitimate, but such child should be
given the right to establish, at any time, for any purpose, and
by any type of affirmative evidence sufficient to satisfy the court,
that his mother's husband is in fact his father.
(4) A child born 300 or more days after divorce or death
of the mother's husband should be considered illegitimate.
Harold J. BrouillZtte
77. Art. 244, Italian Civil Code, provides that the husband is given three
months to bring the action beginning from the time he receives knowledge
of the birth of the child.
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